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RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 At first glance this case appears exceedingly 
complex—with its tangle of debtors, creditors, parents, 
subsidiaries, alter egos, and complex international corporate 
transactions. But when one cuts through this morass, the 
question at the center of this case is quite simple: can a 
transfer by a non-debtor be a “fraudulent transfer” under the 
Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (“DUFTA”)? The 
role of a federal court in this situation is to predict how the 
Supreme Court of Delaware would answer this question. We 
are constrained to conclude that a transfer by a non-debtor 
cannot be a “fraudulent transfer” under DUFTA. While we do 
not condone the debtor’s and the transferor’s actions, we must 
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conclude that Crystallex has failed to state a claim under 
DUFTA.1   
 
I. Background 
A. The Parties and Related Entities 
Appellant Crystallex International Corp. 
(“Crystallex”), a Canadian gold producer, owned the rights to 
Las Cristinas gold reserve in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (“Venezuela”).  In 2011, Venezuela nationalized 
its gold mines and expropriated Crystallex’s rights to Las 
Cristinas. Crystallex subsequently initiated an arbitration 
proceeding against Venezuela before the World Bank. It 
claimed that, by expropriating Crystallex’s rights to Las 
Cristinas, Venezuela had violated a bilateral investment treaty 
with Canada. Venezuela was the sole defendant in the 
arbitration proceeding and the only entity claimed to be 
obligated to Crystallex for any resulting judgment. The 
arbitrators found that Venezuela had breached the treaty and 
awarded Crystallex $1.202 billion. Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. 
Bolivarian Rep. of Venezuela, 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 107 
(D.D.C. 2017). The District Court for the District of 
Columbia confirmed the arbitration award, in accordance 
with the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1, et seq. 
Crystallex, 244 F. Supp. at 122.  
 
Venezuela owns 100% of the shares of Petróleos de 
Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”). PDVSA is alleged to be 
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1367. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear PDVH’s interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).  
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Venezuela’s alter ego, a “national oil company through which 
Venezuela implements government policies at home and 
abroad.” A31. PDVSA owns 100% of PDV Holding, Inc. 
(“PDVH”), which in turn owns 100% of CITGO Holding, 
Inc. (“CITGO Holding”). CITGO Holding owns 100% of 
CITGO Petroleum Corporation (“CITGO Petroleum”). 
PDVSA is a foreign corporation based in Venezuela. PDVH, 
CITGO Holding, and CITGO Petroleum are Delaware 
corporations.  
 
B. Litigation Against PDVH 
Crystallex brought this suit against PDVH2 in the 
District of Delaware, alleging that PDVH had violated 
DUFTA’s prohibition against fraudulent transfers.3 
According to Crystallex, Venezuela realized that it was 
“facing billions of dollars in liability from the numerous 
arbitration proceedings arising from its repeated expropriation 
of foreign investments,” including the Crystallex proceeding. 
A30. “On numerous occasions, Venezuelan government 
officials stated publicly that Venezuela would refuse to pay 
any anticipated arbitral award against it and would 
proactively thwart efforts to enforce such awards.” A40.  
                                              
2 PDVSA and CITGO Holding were also named as 
defendants in the original suit. The District Court dismissed 
Crystallex’s claims against PDVSA and CITGO Holding. 
Those rulings are not before us on appeal.   
3 Crystallex also alleged claims of common law civil 
conspiracy against the three defendants. The District Court 
dismissed those claims against all three defendants. Those 
rulings are not before us on appeal.    
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“As part of [its] plan to thwart enforcement,” 
Venezuela orchestrated a series of debt offerings and asset 
transfers among PDVSA, PDVH, CITGO Holding, and 
CITGO Petroleum. A30. Specifically, Venezuela sought to 
“monetize its interests in CITGO [Petroleum],” its largest 
United States-based asset, and repatriate the proceeds. A40. 
To this end, Venezuela “enlisted its alter ego PDVSA,” who 
in turn “directed its wholly-owned subsidiary PDVH to direct 
its wholly-owned subsidiary CITGO Holding to issue $2.8 
billion in debt.”4 A31. CITGO Holding, in turn, transferred 
the proceeds from the issuance of debt to its parent PDVH as 
a shareholder “dividend.” A31. PDVH then declared a 
dividend of the same amount to its parent PDVSA, a 
Venezuelan corporation and the alleged alter ego of 
Venezuela, thereby repatriating the money to Venezuela and 
shielding it from an enforcement action in the United States. 
Id.  
 
These transactions formed the basis of Crystallex’s 
DUFTA claim against PDVH. As a result of these transfers, 
“nearly $2.8 billion in ‘dividends’ ended up in the hands of 
PDVSA (and therefore Venezuela) outside the United States 
where they could not be reached by Venezuela’s creditors.” 
A43. Under DUFTA,  
 
A transfer made or obligation 
incurred by a debtor is fraudulent 
as to a creditor, whether the 
                                              
4 The mechanics of the $2.8 billion debt offering were fairly 
complex. However, the net result was that CITGO Petroleum 
was left with negative shareholder equity and rendered 
insolvent, with most its value transferred to CITGO Holding.  
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creditor’s claim arose before or 
after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred, if the 
debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation . . . [w]ith 
actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor. 
6 Del. C. § 1304.   
C. District Court Denies PDVH’s Motion to Dismiss 
PDVH moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to 
state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
It argued that Crystallex had failed to state a claim under 
DUFTA because the allegedly fraudulent transfer was not 
made “by a debtor”—that is, by Venezuela—as required by 
the statute. 6 Del. C. § 1304(a).5 The District Court denied 
PDVH’s motion to dismiss, concluding that there had indeed 
been a transfer “by a debtor.” Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. 
Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A., 213 F. Supp. 3d 683 (D. Del. 
2016).  
                                              
5 PDVH’s Motion to Dismiss contained two additional 
arguments. First, it argued that the transfer from PDVH to 
PDVSA did not involve property “of a debtor,” as required by 
the statute. The District Court rejected this argument, and 
PDVH does not challenge this legal analysis on appeal. 
Second, PDVH argued that the DUFTA claim was preempted 
by the attachment immunity provisions of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The District Court 
rejected this argument as well. PDVH appeals that decision. 
Because we will reverse the District Court’s order based on 
the DUFTA claim, we need not reach the FSIA issue.   
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In reaching this conclusion, the District Court first 
correctly stated that Crystallex’s only potential debtors were 
Venezuela and its alleged alter ego PDVSA. Crystallex, 213 
F. Supp. 3d at 691. Therefore, “in the narrowest sense of the 
term,” none of the transfers were “directly undertaken ‘by’ 
the ‘debtor.’” Id.  Nonetheless, the District Court found that 
PDVH—a “non-debtor transferor”—could be liable under 
DUFTA for its dividend transfer to PDVSA. Id. at 693. In 
support of this conclusion, the District Court noted that 
“DUFTA includes within its ambit ‘indirect . . . mode(s) . . . 
of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an 
asset.’” Id. at 691 (quoting 6 Del. C. § 1301(12)). It also cited 
Merriam-Webster’s definition of the word “by,” which 
includes “through the agency or instrumentality of” and “on 
behalf of.” Id. Given the alleged “extensive, if not 
dominating, involvement” of the debtor Venezuela, the 
PDVH transfer was executed by an “instrumentality” of the 
debtor or on its “behalf.” Id. Therefore, the District Court 
reasoned, the transfer from PDVH to PDVSA was “a transfer 
made in every meaningful sense ‘by a debtor,’” despite the 
fact that PDVH was not in fact a debtor. Id. at 691-92.  
Finally, the District Court noted that its holding was in line 
with the purpose of DUFTA, which “broadly provides for the 
application of ‘the principles of law and equity.’” Id. at 692.  
 
PDVH filed a motion to certify the District Court’s 
Order for interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(b), arguing that the District Court incorrectly concluded 
that DUFTA extends to transfers by non-debtors. After 
briefing and oral argument, the District Court granted 
PDVH’s motion, and we accepted PDVH’s petition for 
permissive review.  
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II. Analysis6 
 While we acknowledge the appeal to equity that the 
District Court and our dissenting colleague have expressed, 
we are compelled to conclude that we must reverse the 
District Court’s Order denying PDVH’s motion to dismiss, 
because transfers by non-debtors are not fraudulent transfers 
under DUFTA as it has been interpreted by the Delaware 
courts. To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege 
each “required element” of his claim. Phillips v. Cty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234-35 (3d Cir. 2008). The DUFTA 
statute reads, in relevant part:  
 
A transfer made or obligation 
incurred by a debtor is fraudulent 
as to a creditor, whether the 
creditor’s claim arose before or 
after the transfer was made or the 
obligation was incurred, if the 
debtor made the transfer or 
incurred the obligation . . . [w]ith 
actual intent to hinder, delay or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor. 
                                              
6 We review a District Court’s denial of a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss de novo. F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide 
Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2015). We “accept all 
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under 
any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.” Wyndham Worldwide, 799 F.3d at 242.  
 
10 
 
6 Del. C. § 1304 (emphasis 
added).  
In order to withstand a motion to dismiss a claim under 
DUFTA, therefore, Crystallex must successfully plead three 
things: (1) a transfer, (2) by a debtor, (3) with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor. This case turns on the 
meaning of the second element, “by a debtor.” 
 
 Based on the decisions of the Delaware Chancery 
Court and other Delaware state law principles, we conclude 
that the transfer by non-debtor PDVH to PSVHA was not a 
fraudulent transfer under DUFTA. “Our role in diversity 
cases is to apply state law.” Sheridan v. NGK Metals, 609 
F.3d 239, 254 (3d Cir. 2010).  “A federal court under Erie is 
bound to follow state law as announced by the highest state 
court.” Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 361 (3d 
Cir. 2007). “[I]f that state’s highest court has not provided 
guidance, we are charged with predicting how that court 
would resolve the issue.” In re Energy Future Holdings Corp. 
v. Energy Future Intermediate Holdings Co., 842 F.3d 247, 
253-54 (3d Cir. 2016). In doing so, we must give “due 
deference” to the intermediate state courts’ rulings. In re 
Makowka, 754 F.3d 143, 148 (3d Cir. 2014). “This standard 
places a significant constraint on us[.]” Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 
254 (quoting Jewelcor Inc. v. Karfunkel, 517 F.3d 672, 676 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2008)). “Unlike our role in interpreting federal 
law, we may not ‘act as a judicial pioneer’ in a diversity 
case.” Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 254 (citation omitted).  
 
Crystallex alleges that PDVH’s transfer to PDVSA 
was part of a scheme, designed in part by Venezuela, to 
transfer $2.8 billion out of the United States, placing it out of 
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the reach of Crystallex or other creditors attempting to 
enforce a judgment against Venezuela. It alleges that, 
“[t]ogether, [Venezuela, through its alter ego] PDVSA, 
PDVH, and CITGO Holding . . . devised a scheme” to 
liquidate the value of CITGO Petroleum, Venezuela’s largest 
United States-based asset.  A31, A41. Pursuant to this 
“strategy concocted by PDVSA, PDVH, and CITGO 
Holding,” CITGO Holding would transfer billions of dollars 
to PDVH “where, in turn, those funds would be paid as a 
dividend to PDVH’s direct parent[,] . . . moving the funds to 
PDVSA outside the United States.” A41.  
 
But more important is what Crystallex does not allege. 
It does not allege that PDVH is a debtor or otherwise liable 
for the arbitral judgment Crystallex has obtained against 
Venezuela. Absent is any allegation that Venezuela or 
PDVSA—the only potential debtors7—transferred any 
property. Instead, Venezuela, through its alleged alter ego 
PDVSA, received the $2.8 billion in question. The transfer 
was clearly alleged to have been by the non-debtor PDVH. As 
an initial matter, this transaction seems to lack the principal 
harm visited upon creditors in a fraudulent transfer, namely 
the debtor’s alienation of an asset otherwise available to pay 
its debts. Here, the alienation complained of was 
geographical. It was not technically a transfer by the debtor 
but a transfer to the debtor which, by virtue of international 
law, resulted in the assets being out of the reach of creditors. 
This situation is not covered, or contemplated, by DUFTA.  
                                              
7 PDVSA was not involved in the arbitration proceeding. But 
if we accept as true Crystallex’s allegation that PDVSA is the 
alter ego of Venezuela, it is at least theoretically possible that 
PDVSA could be liable for the arbitration award as well.  
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The allegations in the complaint raise two questions. 
First, can a transfer by a non-debtor such as PDVH constitute 
a fraudulent transfer under DUFTA? If not, we then ask 
whether the allegations in the complaint, whereby the debtor 
Venezuela devised the scheme, can state a claim for relief 
under DUFTA based on either an aiding and abetting or a 
conspiracy theory. The answer to both questions is no.  
 
A. Non-Debtor Liability Under DUFTA 
Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not had the 
opportunity to consider whether non-debtor transferors can 
commit fraudulent transfers under DUFTA, the Chancery 
Court has answered that question in the negative. See 
Edgewater Growth Capital Partners v. H.I.G. Capital, Inc., 
C.A. No. 3601-VCS, 2010 WL 720150, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
3, 2010) (“By its own terms, the Delaware Fraudulent 
Transfer Act only provides for a cause of action by a creditor 
against debtor-transferors or transferees.”); In re Wickes 
Trust, No. Civ. A. 2515-VCS, 2008 WL 4698477, at *7-8 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2008) (“in order to have a fraudulent 
transfer claim, one must have a valid claim against the person 
. . . alleged to have fraudulently made the transfer”).8   
                                              
8 Although these and several other Chancery Court opinions 
we rely on are unpublished, Delaware courts give such 
opinions substantial precedential weight. See Aprahamian v. 
HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1207 (Del. Ch. 1987) (“An 
unreported decision [is] entitled to great deference”); 1-4 
Corp. and Commercial Practice in DE Court of Chancery § 
4.04, Lexis (2017) (“The mere fact that a case is not reported 
should not be taken to suggest that unpublished decisions are 
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 The Chancery Court has also rejected fraudulent 
transfer claims against non-debtor transferors under 
analogous provisions in the federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 
U.S.C.A. § 548.  See Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT 
Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586, at *3 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 18, 2016), aff’d sub nom. Klauder v. ECHO/RT 
Holdings, LLC, No. 133, 2016 WL 7189917 (Del. Dec. 12, 
2016) (rejecting a fraudulent conveyance claim against a non-
debtor subsidiary of the debtor parent company). See also In 
re Plassein Int’l Corp. v. B.A. Capital Co., 366 B.R. 318, 326 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2007), aff’d. 388 B.R. 46 (D. Del. 2008), 
aff’d 590 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2009) (dismissing state and 
federal fraudulent transfer claims because the allegedly 
fraudulent transfer was made by a non-debtor).  
 
Although Crystallex’s claim arises under DUFTA, not 
the Bankruptcy Code, these decisions are instructive. The 
relevant DUFTA and Bankruptcy Code provisions are nearly 
identical, and Delaware courts have interpreted and applied 
them uniformly. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 548 with 6 Del. C. 
§§1302-1306. “Because Delaware has adopted the Federal 
UFTA, a statute that was itself modeled on Section 548 of the 
Bankruptcy Code . . . Delaware courts generally recognize 
                                                                                                     
without precedential value. Emphatically to the contrary, 
unpublished letter and memorandum opinions, and even some 
oral rulings from the bench, are afforded a considerable 
precedential weight [in Delaware], especially in view of the 
fact that unreported decisions often are the only authority on 
point where novel issues are involved”). In predicting how 
the Delaware Supreme Court would resolve this issue, we 
thus give such opinions substantial precedential weight as 
well. 
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that our state and the federal fraudulent transfer statutes’ 
principles are substantially the same.” Ki-Poong Lee v. So, 
C.A. No. N14C-08-173 PRW, 2016 WL 6806247, at *3 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2016). See also In re PHP Healthcare 
Corp., 128 Fed. Appx. 839, 847 (3d Cir. 2005) (“We need not 
discuss the provisions of the Delaware Fraudulent Transfer 
Act . . . because they are substantially the same as the relevant 
parts of the Bankruptcy Code).  DUFTA is “virtually a carbon 
copy of the fraudulent transfer law under the Bankruptcy 
Code” and “the result under Delaware law should be the same 
as the outcome under the Bankruptcy Code.” In re Trace Int’l 
Holdings, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 287 B.R. 98, 105 n.5 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002). Just as the Chancery Court has 
found that a non-debtor transferor is not liable under the 
Bankruptcy Code, a non-debtor transferor is not liable under 
DUFTA.  
 
  Here, Crystallex has failed to allege that PDVH is a 
debtor or that PDVH would otherwise be liable to Crystallex 
for any judgment against Venezuela. The Dissent notes that 
no Delaware case has specifically “held that non-debtor 
transferors are immune from liability under the Act.” 
Dissenting Op. at 4. But the question here is not one of 
immunity. Rather, we must decide whether a transfer by a 
non-debtor fits within the statutory definition of a fraudulent 
transfer in the first place. Because relevant Delaware 
precedent makes it clear that the answer to this question is 
“no,” non-debtor PDVH simply could not have committed a 
fraudulent transfer in violation of DUFTA.  
 
In addition, reading “by a debtor” broadly enough to 
allow a non-debtor subsidiary transferor (here, PDVH) to be 
liable, simply because its parent company (here, Venezuela, 
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through its alter ego PDVSA) is a debtor, would undermine a 
fundamental precept of Delaware corporate law: parent and 
subsidiary corporations are separate legal entities. As the 
District Court correctly noted, “Delaware public policy does 
not lightly disregard the separate legal existence of 
corporations.” Crystallex, 213 F. Supp. 3d at 690 (quoting 
Spring Real Estate, 2016 WL 769586, at *3 n.35). 
“Persuading a Delaware court to disregard the corporate 
entity is a difficult task.” Wallace ex rel. Cencom Cable 
Income Partners II v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Del. Ch. 
1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Delaware law 
“tends to accord dignity to legal entities except in cases in 
which the traditional law of piercing the corporate veil is 
met.” Hart Holding Co. v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. 
C.A. No. 11514, 1992 WL 127567, at n.11 (Del. Ch. 1992). 
Such cases are rare, and include situations where the 
subsidiary is a mere “alter ego” of the parent. See Mabon, 
Nugent & Co. v. Texas Am. Energy Corp., CIV A No. 8578, 
1990 WL 44267 (Del. Ch. 1990) (describing possible grounds 
for piercing the corporate veil under Delaware law).  
Crystallex alleges in great detail that PDVSA is Venezuela’s 
alter ego. But that is beside the point. Tellingly, it does not 
allege that PDVH is Venezuela’s or PDVSA’s alter ego or 
any other basis on which we could “pierce the corporate veil.” 
Absent such allegations, we are unwilling to disregard 
PDVH’s distinct corporate identity and attribute to it the 
actions of the debtor. 
 
 Crystallex’s remaining arguments for interpreting 
DUFTA to cover non-debtor transferors are also of no avail. 
First, Crystallex urges that non-debtor transferors are covered 
by DUFTA because § 1307(c) of the statute shows that the 
legislature contemplated such liability. Under § 1307(c), “a 
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creditor shall have no right to relief against any trustee, 
attorney or other advisor who has not acted in bad faith on 
account of any transfer.” 6 Del. C. § 1307(c). According to 
Crystallex, the inverse must be true: non-debtors—namely, 
trustees, attorneys, or other advisors—who have acted in bad 
faith can be liable under DUFTA. This argument fails. First, 
this section of the statute does not affirmatively authorize 
suits against non-debtors. Second, even if it did authorize 
such suits, Crystallex does not allege that PDVH was a 
trustee, attorney, or other advisor. Moreover, we question the 
continued validity of this portion of the statute. As PDVH 
argues, since its enactment in 1999, § 1307(c) may have been 
rendered “surplusage” by Delaware case law finding that 
DUFTA only provides a cause of action against debtors, 
thereby shielding advisors from liability. See Reply Br. for 
Appellant at 21 (citing Edgewater, 2010 WL 720150, at *2).  
 
Similarly, Crystallex argues to no avail that § 1308 of 
the statute supports non-debtor liability. Section 1308 
provides that transferees are not liable under the statute if 
they received title in good faith for equivalent value. 6 Del. C. 
§ 1308. Crystallex seems to suggest that since good faith 
transferees are not liable under the statute, relief should be 
afforded against bad faith non-debtor transferors. See 6 Del. 
C. § 1308. But this is a non sequitur. Moreover, there simply 
is no support for subjecting bad faith non-debtor transferors to 
liability under the Delaware case law. We are not permitted to 
“act as a judicial pioneer” when applying state law, and are 
therefore unwilling to expand the statute to cover bad faith 
non-debtor transferors. Sheridan, 609 F.3d at 253.  
 Nor are we persuaded by Crystallex’s claim that courts 
in other jurisdictions have found non-debtor transferors liable 
under similar fraudulent transfer statutes. Crystallex cites 
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only two such cases: Gutierrez v. Givens, 1 F. Supp. 2d 1077 
(S.D. Cal. 1998), and In re Carousel Candy Co. v Weber, 38 
B.R. 927 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Those case are not binding on us, 
nor would they be binding on the Delaware Supreme Court. 
Regardless, these cases are inapposite. The defendant bank in 
Gutierrez did not argue that it was not liable under the 
California fraudulent transfer statute, Cal. Civil Code § 3439, 
based on its non-debtor status. Instead, it argued that the 
fraudulent transfer claim against it should be dismissed 
because the main remedy available under the statute did not 
apply to a non-transferee such as the bank. Gutierrez, 1 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1087. The court rejected this argument, finding 
that if the bank was liable under the statute, the bank could 
still be subject to alternative remedies. Id. It did not have to 
determine whether the non-debtor bank could be liable under 
the statute. Carousel is also distinguishable. In that case, the 
court allowed a fraudulent transfer claim to proceed against a 
non-debtor, but it based its decision on the fact that the 
transferor was the debtor’s attorney, owed the debtor a 
fiduciary duty, and “was de facto in control of the debtor” at 
the time of the transfer. 38 B.R. at 938. Those facts are not 
present here, nor does the Delaware case law hint at 
broadening the concept of “by a debtor” in such a fact pattern.  
 
Even if we were to consider out-of-jurisdiction cases, 
the majority of courts that have considered the issue have 
rejected non-debtor transferor liability. See, e.g., Ferri v. 
Powell-Ferri, No. MMXCV116006351S, 2012 WL 3854425 
at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 30, 2012) (striking a fraudulent 
transfer claim against a non-debtor transferor and finding no 
support for the position that “a third party can be liable for 
making a fraudulent transfer as to a party to whom the third 
party is not a debtor”); Folmar & Assoc’s LLP v. Holberg, 
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776 So. 2d 112, 118 (Ala. 2000), overruled on other grounds 
by White Sands Grp., LLC v. PRS IILLC, 32 So. 3d 5 (Ala. 
2009) (rejecting a fraudulent transfer claim and finding “no 
case in which the provisions of the Alabama Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act have been extended to apply to 
transferors other than the debtor”); cf. Healthco Int’l, Inc., 
201 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (finding that the 
transfers at issue were “not transfers by the Debtor and hence 
are immune from fraudulent transfer attack” under the federal 
Bankruptcy Code).  
 
We also decline to rely on the broader dictionary 
definition of “by”—which includes “through the agency or 
instrumentality of” and “on behalf of”—to extend DUFTA to 
cover non-debtor transferors. First, we do not read the 
allegations in the complaint to actually aver that PDVH acted 
as an agent or “on behalf of” Venezuela. Second, we need not 
resort to dictionary definitions where the Delaware courts 
have clearly indicated that “by a debtor” means that the 
debtor itself must have made the transfer.   
 
Finally, we reject Crystallex’s argument that DUFTA’s 
“broad remedial purpose” should cause us to declare the 
transfer fraudulent. Br. for Appellant, 37. We also decline to 
find the non-debtor transfer here fraudulent based on 
equitable considerations, as our dissenting colleague suggests. 
Dissenting Op. at 9. It is true that “DUFTA grants a court 
‘broad latitude’ for the court to craft a remedy,” Lake 
Treasure Holdings, Ltd. v. Foundry Hill GP LLC, C.A. No. 
6546-VCL, 2014 WL 5192179 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2014) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added), and “leaves considerable 
leeway for the exercise of equitable discretion” in doing so. In 
re Mobilactive Media, LLC, C.A. No. 5725-VCP, 2013 WL 
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297950 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2009).  See also 6 Del. C. § 
1307(a)(3)(c) (courts may invoke equitable principles to craft 
“[a]ny [] relief the circumstances may require”). But having 
broad latitude to craft a remedy for a DUFTA violation does 
not necessarily mean we have broad latitude to determine 
what fits within the contours of the statute in the first place. 
Moreover, the Chancery Court is a court of equity. See 10 
Del. C. § 341 (“The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction 
to hear and determine all matters and causes in equity.”). It 
has had the opportunity to conclude, as an equitable matter, 
that DUFTA covers transfers by non-debtors. But, so far, it 
has not. Delaware courts have closed the door to non-debtor 
transferor liability under the state statute, and we are not free 
to open it. 
 
Sidestepping the “by the debtor” requirement, 
Crystallex looks to other elements of the statute in an attempt 
to cover the transaction. First, Crystallex focuses on the 
“transfer” element.  It points to the statute’s broad definition 
of “transfer,” which includes both direct and indirect 
transfers, and argues that the indirect transfer here is therefore 
covered by the statute. See 6 Del. C. § 1301(12) (“‘Transfer’ 
means every mode, direct or indirect, . . .  of disposing of or 
parting with an asset or an interest in an asset”). The Dissent 
cites this language as well, arguing that our interpretation 
reads the term “indirect” out of the statute. Dissenting Op. at 
7. But this argument conflates two separate elements of a 
DUFTA claim: (1) a transfer (2) made by the debtor. In other 
words, DUFTA may cover an indirect transfer, but that 
transfer must nonetheless be made “by a debtor” in order to 
be cognizable under the statute. Nothing in the complaint 
suggests that Venezuela, the debtor, transferred an asset 
directly or indirectly. Indeed, it was the recipient of the assets.  
20 
 
 
Crystallex also understandably focuses on the 
intentional nature of the transaction—to remove assets from 
the United States to Venezuela where they would not be 
subject to execution by Venezuela’s creditors. Crystallex 
points to various “badges of fraud,” including the fact that 
several Venezuelan officials publicly said that the 
government would not pay any arbitral awards and that the 
purpose of the transfers was to shield CITGO Petroleum from 
potential arbitration judgments. A40-41, A62. Certainly, the 
intent behind this series of transactions was to hinder 
creditors. It may be tempting to conclude that PDVH’s 
transfer to PDVSA was therefore a fraudulent transfer under 
DUFTA. But these badges of fraud go to only one of the three 
necessary elements of a DUFTA claim—“actual intent” to 
hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor. 6 Del. C. § 
1304. Despite detailed allegations of intent, Crystallex’s 
DUFTA claim against PDVH nonetheless fails because it 
does not allege a transfer “by a debtor.”  
 
B. Theories of Aiding and Abetting and Conspiracy Under 
DUFTA 
 
We now must decide whether Crystallex’s complaint 
nonetheless states a DUFTA claim against PDVH, given the 
debtor Venezuela’s alleged role in the transfer scheme. 
Crystallex clearly alleges that “Venezuela, through its alter 
ego, PDVSA, perpetrated this transfer to hinder or delay 
Crystallex’s ability to enforce its arbitration award.” A34. 
Venezuela “devised” the scheme and “enlisted” its alter ego 
PDVSA to “extract as much value as possible from CITGO.”  
A31. PDVSA did so by “orchestrating” a series of transfers 
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that “converted CITGO’s value to cash, then removing those 
funds from the United States and transferring them into 
PDVSA’s coffers in Venezuela.” A31. “All of the steps in 
this fraudulent transfer were planned out . . . and were part of 
a single scheme” to benefit Venezuela. A43.  
 
The issue thus becomes whether a claim under 
DUFTA can be stated where the debtor orchestrated a scheme 
whereby a non-debtor transferred assets to the debtor. 
Presumably, this would be based on a theory of aiding and 
abetting the transfer, or on a theory of conspiracy. The 
Dissent would find that “even though PDV Holding was not a 
debtor to Crystallex, it clearly facilitated the fraudulent 
transfer and is therefore a proper defendant in this case.” 
Dissenting Op. at 4. However, according to Delaware courts, 
a DUFTA claim based on a theory of non-principal liability is 
not cognizable under the statute. The Chancery Court has 
foreclosed the possibility of aiding and abetting liability 
under DUFTA. Edgewater, 2010 WL 720150 at *2 (“[T]he 
Delaware Fraudulent Transfer Act does not create a cause of 
action for aiding and abetting or conspiring to commit, a 
fraudulent transfer.”); Trenwick American Litigation Trust v. 
Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 906 A.2d 168, 203 (Del. Ch. 2006) 
(“Despite the breadth of remedies available under state and 
federal fraudulent conveyance statutes, those laws have not 
been interpreted as creating a cause of action for ‘aiding and 
abetting.’”), Nor can Crystallex succeed on a theory of 
conspiracy, as the Chancery Court has specifically ruled to 
the contrary. See Quadrant Structured Products Co. v. Vertin, 
102 A.3d 155, 203 (Del. Ch. 2014) (“Under Delaware law, a 
conspiracy cannot be predicated on fraudulent transfer”).  
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 We must give due deference to the Delaware courts’ 
opinions on these issues of state law, and these opinions limit 
DUFTA to transfers by debtors—which PDVH is not alleged 
to be. We cannot extend DUFTA beyond these confines. “We 
leave to . . . the state legislatures and, where relevant, to the 
state courts the task of expanding or restricting liability 
[theories].” Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 
271, 274 (3d Cir. 1985). Crystallex has failed to successfully 
plead a transfer “by a debtor” and thus failed to successfully 
plead a fraudulent transfer claim against PDVH under 
DUFTA.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the order of 
the District Court and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
 
  
FUENTES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
Crystallex, a Canadian company, owned the exclusive 
rights to Las Cristinas, a gold mine in the Republic of 
Venezuela (“Venezuela”).  According to the complaint, the 
mine has one of the largest unmined gold reserves in the 
world, between 17 and 26 million ounces of gold.  For nearly 
a decade, Crystallex invested more than $640 million to 
develop the mine.  However, despite Crystallex’s many 
applications, Venezuela never issued the permits needed to 
extract and sell gold.  Eventually, claiming that Crystallex 
had stalled progress on the mine’s development, Venezuela 
terminated Crystallex’s mining agreement and seized the 
mine.  According to Crystallex, this was all part of 
Venezuela’s scheme to expropriate its substantial investment. 
 
Following the seizure, Venezuela transferred 
Crystallex’s interest in the mine to Petróleos de Venezuela, 
S.A. (“Petróleos”), a state-owned company.  Petróleos, in 
turn, sold 40% of that interest to the Venezuelan Central Bank 
for $9.5 billion.  Venezuela’s seizure forced Crystallex into 
bankruptcy.  Having lost its entire investment in the mine, 
Crystallex brought an arbitration against Venezuela under a 
treaty between Canada and Venezuela.  Ultimately, the 
arbitration tribunal found that Venezuela’s conduct violated 
the treaty and awarded Crystallex over $1.2 billion in 
damages.1 
                                              
1 The District Court for the District of Columbia later 
confirmed the award and entered judgment in Crystallex’s 
favor for over $1.2 billion.  See Crystallex Int’l Corp. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of Venez., 244 F. Supp. 3d 100, 105 
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  While the arbitration was pending, Venezuela 
repeatedly, including through its former President Hugo 
Chávez, maintained that it would refuse to pay any arbitration 
award.  To that end, Venezuela devised a fraudulent scheme 
to transfer $2.8 billion out of the United States.  It did so 
through a complex series of debt offerings and dividend 
transfers involving Petróleos and its wholly-owned Delaware 
subsidiaries, Citgo Holding, Inc. (“Citgo Holding”) and 
defendant PDV Holding, Inc. (“PDV Holding”).2  
Venezuela’s purpose was clear: to move its assets out of the 
United States to prevent judgment creditors like Crystallex 
from executing upon them. 
 
 The following diagram depicts the flow of funds from 
the United States to Venezuela as alleged by Crystallex: 
                                                                                                     
(D.D.C. 2017).  As of this writing, Venezuela’s appeal of that 
decision is pending.   
2 Interestingly, the bond offering materials said that “no 
assurance can be given that any of the [t]ransactions would 
not be challenged as a fraudulent transfer.”  A-44.  
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Against this background, the majority holds that 
Crystallex cannot assert a claim against PDV Holding—the 
only remaining defendant in this case—under the Delaware 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (the “Fraudulent Transfer 
Act” or the “Act”) because PDV Holding, a Delaware 
corporation, was merely a non-debtor transferor, and not a 
debtor or transferee, in the fraudulent scheme.  I disagree.  I 
would affirm the District Court.   
 
I would conclude that Crystallex has adequately pled a 
claim under the Fraudulent Transfer Act against PDV 
Holding, a direct participant in the fraudulent transfer.  
Specifically, as the District Court found, PDV Holding’s 
issuance of a $2.8 billion dividend to Petróleos, at 
Petróleos, immune from suit under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, received a $2.8 billion 
dividend in Venezuela. 
At the direction of Petróleos, PDV 
Holding, a Delaware corporation, 
issued a $2.8 billion dividend to 
Petróleos. 
 
At the direction of Petróleos, a 
Venezuelan state-owned company, 
Citgo Holding, a Delaware 
corporation, issued a $2.8 billion 
dividend to PDV Holding. 
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Venezuela’s direction, was a “transfer” of debtor property “by 
a debtor” under the Fraudulent Transfer Act.  And, like the 
District Court, I would find that even though PDV Holding 
was not a debtor to Crystallex, it clearly facilitated the 
fraudulent transfer and is therefore a proper defendant in this 
case.   
 
As I view the facts, it cannot be that the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, which is firmly grounded in principles of 
equity, leaves Crystallex—the victim of a purposeful and 
complicated fraud—without any remedy for PDV Holding’s 
role in transferring $2.8 billion out of the United States to 
avoid Venezuela’s creditors.  The Fraudulent Transfer Act 
does not support such a result.   
 
However, today the majority signals that a party, such 
as PDV Holding, may knowingly participate in a fraudulent 
transfer so long as it is not a debtor.  Indeed, a consequence of 
the majority’s holding is that, under the Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, a foreign sovereign—such as Venezuela—is free to 
fraudulently repatriate assets, so long as the party making the 
transfer is a non-debtor.  That result does not comport with—
but rather is wholly contrary to—the Act’s broad remedial 
purpose.   
 
Moreover, I believe the majority is wrong as a matter 
of law.  According to the majority, the “Delaware courts have 
closed the door to non-debtor transferor liability under” the 
Fraudulent Transfer Act.3  I cannot agree.  None of the cases 
cited by the majority have held that non-debtor transferors are 
immune from liability under the Act.   
                                              
3 Maj. Op. at 19. 
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To the contrary, the committee that drafted the 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the model statute on which 
the Fraudulent Transfer Act is based, plainly stated that its 
remedies are not exclusive.4  Indeed, the Fraudulent Transfer 
Act grants courts broad latitude to craft remedies in response 
to fraudulent transfers.  Specifically, the Act provides that 
courts may craft “[a]ny [] relief the circumstances may 
require.”5  What’s more, as the District Court noted, the Act 
states that “principles of law and equity” should be used to 
“supplement its provisions” unless “displaced by the [Act’s] 
provisions.”6 
 
Importantly, the Fraudulent Transfer Act does not, by 
its own terms, bar a claim against a non-debtor transferor 
such as PDV Holding.  Thus, in keeping with the Act’s 
requirement that courts “supplement its provisions” with the 
“principles of law and equity,” we must determine whether, 
assuming the fraudulent transfer scheme occurred as alleged, 
it was appropriate for the District Court to conclude that 
defendant PDV Holding’s “continued presence in this action 
is appropriate.”7  
 
                                              
4 See Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 7 cmt. 1 (1984) (“The 
remedies specified in this section are not exclusive.”).  The 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which was promulgated by 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Law in 1984, has been adopted in all but a handful of states.   
5 6 Del. C. § 1307(a)(3)(c). 
6 Id. § 1310. 
7 A-13. 
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 Because I would hold that the answer is yes, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
I.  Crystallex Stated a Fraudulent Transfer Act Claim 
 
 I completely agree with the District Court that 
Crystallex pled a Fraudulent Transfer Act claim against PDV 
Holding.  I also agree with the District Court that PDV 
Holding’s non-debtor status does not (and should not) shield 
it from liability for its fraudulent repatriation of $2.8 billion to 
Petróleos, a Venezuelan state-owned company. 
 
 A.  The Dividend to Petróleos Was a “Transfer” 
 
 Under the Fraudulent Transfer Act, a “transfer” 
includes “every mode, direct or indirect . . . of disposing of or 
parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.”8  “Asset” is 
defined broadly as “property of a debtor.”9  The District Court 
found that PDV Holding’s $2.8 billion dividend to Petróleos 
involved the “property of a debtor,” and therefore, was a 
“transfer” under the Act.  I agree with that conclusion, and 
PDV Holding does not challenge it on appeal. 
 
  B.  The Transfer Was Made “By a Debtor” 
 
 The majority first holds that Crystallex’s claim fails 
because the $2.8 billion dividend to Petróleos was made by 
PDV Holding, not Petróleos itself, and thus not “by a debtor” 
under the Fraudulent Transfer Act.  I disagree.  In my view, 
                                              
8 6 Del. C. § 1301(12). 
9 Id. § 1301(2). 
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and consistent with the Act, PDV Holding’s dividend to 
Petróleos, as requested by Venezuela, was an indirect transfer 
“by a debtor.”  As such, it is a clear violation of the Act.     
 
 A transfer must be “by a debtor” to be actionable 
under the Act.  As the District Court noted, a “transfer” 
includes “every mode, direct or indirect . . . of disposing of or 
parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.”10  The 
majority’s interpretation of “by a debtor” reads the term 
“indirect” out of the Act.  This result does not comport with 
our practice of “avoid[ing] interpretations that effectively 
read words out of a statute.”11   
 
 Further, the Act does not define the phrase “by a 
debtor.”  “When words are left undefined, we have turned to 
‘standard reference works such as legal and general 
dictionaries in order to ascertain’ their ordinary meaning.”12  
In fact, this approach mirrors the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
method for interpreting undefined words in statutes.13  
Merriam-Webster’s dictionary defines “by” to include “on 
                                              
10 Id. § 1301(12) (emphasis added). 
11 United States v. Taylor, 686 F.3d 182, 193 (3d Cir. 2012). 
12 Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 
2008)). 
13 See Cephas v. State, 911 A.2d 799, 801 (Del. 2006) 
(“Under well-settled case law, Delaware courts look to 
dictionaries for assistance in determining the plain meaning 
of terms which are not defined[.]” (quoting Lorillard Tobacco 
Co. v. Am. Legacy Found., 903 A.2d 728, 738 (Del. 2006))). 
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behalf of.”14  As such, as the District Court did, I would hold 
that a transfer is made “by a debtor” under the Act when it is 
executed on the debtor’s “behalf.”   
 
 Here, Crystallex alleges that PDV Holding’s $2.8 
billion dividend to Petróleos was part of a complex scheme 
directed by Venezuela.  On these facts, I would find that PDV 
Holding’s dividend to Petróleos, sent on Venezuela’s behalf, 
was a transfer “by a debtor.”  I find the majority’s arguments 
to the contrary unconvincing.15       
                                              
14 Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 157 (10th ed. 
1996). 
15 The majority argues that the scheme alleged “is not 
covered, or contemplated, by [the Act]” because the transfer 
went to the debtor.  Maj. Op. at 11.  I disagree.  As noted, 
under the Act, a “transfer” includes “every mode . . . of 
disposing of or parting with an asset.”  6 Del. C. § 1301(12) 
(emphasis added).  The Act does not define “disposing of.”  
But, in dictionary terms, “dispose of” means “to place, 
distribute, or arrange.”  Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 335 (10th ed. 1996).  Here, PDV Holding’s 
dividend to Petróleos caused the proceeds to be “placed” in 
Venezuela.  From this, I would hold that PDV Holding’s 
dividend falls within the Act because it “dispose[d] of” 
Venezuela’s property.  To be sure, since “transfer” also 
includes “parting with an asset,” the phrase “disposing of” 
would be redundant if it only captured the movement of 
property away from the debtor.  See United States v. Reeves, 
752 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1985) (“A statute should be read 
to avoid rendering its language redundant if reasonably 
possible.”). 
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 C. Equity Dictates That PDV Holding is Liable 
Under the Fraudulent Transfer Act  
 
 Moreover, I disagree with the majority’s holding that 
non-debtor transferors, such as PDV Holding, are immune 
from liability under the Act.  Specifically, the majority asserts 
that “Delaware courts have closed the door to non-debtor 
transferor liability under” the Act.16   
 
 In this regard, the majority primarily relies on the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Edgewater Growth 
Capital Partners L.P. v. H.I.G. Capital, Inc.17  In Edgewater, 
a minority owner of a corporation sought to hold the 
corporation’s former directors liable under the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act for aiding and abetting the corporation’s sale of 
its assets to a senior lender.  In support of its aiding and 
abetting theory, the minority owner alleged that the directors 
“conspired with” the senior lender to cause the corporation 
“to run an unfair, tainted sales process.”18  However, the 
Court held that the Act “does not create a cause of action for 
aiding and abetting a fraudulent transfer, or conspiring to 
commit, a fraudulent transfer.”19  In Edgewater, the Court 
observed that “[b]y its own terms, the [] Fraudulent Transfer 
Act only provides for a cause of action by a creditor against 
debtor-transferors or transferees.”20 
                                              
16 Maj. Op. at 19. 
17 C.A. No. 3601-VCS, 2010 WL 720150 (Del. Ch. Mar. 3, 
2010). 
18 Id. at *1. 
19 Id. at *2. 
20 Id. 
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 The majority interprets this to mean that Edgewater 
definitively holds that non-debtor transferors such as PDV 
Holding are immune from liability under the Fraudulent 
Transfer Act.  Admittedly, reading that sentence in isolation 
gives this argument some facial appeal.  However, Edgewater 
merely addressed whether the Act recognizes an aiding and 
abetting claim.  In fact, it does not appear that the Delaware 
courts have ever held that non-debtor transferors are immune 
from liability under the Act.   
 
 Additionally, unlike the majority, I do not interpret 
Crystallex’s complaint as alleging an aiding and abetting or 
conspiracy claim against PDV Holding.  Instead, Crystallex 
asserts that PDV Holding directly participated in the 
fraudulent scheme.  Indeed, unlike the directors in Edgewater, 
Crystallex alleges that PDV Holding directly conveyed $2.8 
billion in dividend proceeds to Petróleos in Venezuela.  
 
 The majority also relies on In re Wickes Trust in 
asserting that the Delaware Chancery Court has barred non-
debtor transferor liability under the Act.21  However, In re 
Wickes Trust only stands for the proposition that a plaintiff 
cannot bring a fraudulent transfer claim unless she is a 
creditor of the debtor.22  In re Wickes Trust does not appear 
relevant to the question of whether the Act recognizes non-
debtor transferor liability.23 
                                              
21 C.A. No. 2515-VCS, 2008 WL 4698477 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 
2008). 
22 Id. at *7-8. 
23 The majority also cites Spring Real Estate, LLC v. Echo/RT 
Holdings, LLC, C.A. No 7994-VCN, 2016 WL 769586 (Del. 
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   In my view, the Fraudulent Transfer Act is meant to 
serve a broad remedial purpose with respect to the specific 
circumstances of a fraudulent transfer.  As the Delaware 
Chancery Court has observed, the Fraudulent Transfer Act 
“grants a court ‘broad latitude’ . . . to craft a remedy to ‘put a 
creditor in the position she would have been in had the 
fraudulent transfer not occurred.’”24  Moreover, the Act states 
that “the principles of law and equity” should be used to 
“supplement its provisions” unless “displaced by the [Act’s] 
provisions.”25  To that end, the Act provides that courts may 
invoke equitable principles to craft “[a]ny [] relief the 
circumstances may require.”26 
 
                                                                                                     
Ch. Feb. 18, 2016), in stating that the Delaware Chancery 
Court “has [] rejected fraudulent transfer claims against non-
debtor transferors under analogous provisions in the federal 
Bankruptcy Code.”  Maj. Op. at 13.  However, in that case, 
the Court rejected the claim because the assets did not belong 
to the debtor.  Here, PDV Holding’s dividend to Petróleos 
plainly involved debtor property. 
24 Lake Treasure Holdings, Ltd. v. Foundry Hill GP LLC, 
C.A. No. 6546-VCL, 2014 WL 5192179, at *15 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 10, 2014) (quoting August v. August, C.A. No. 3180-
VCS, 2009 WL 458778, at *10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 20, 2009)); see 
also In re Mobilactive Media, LLC, C.A. No. 5725-VCP, 
2013 WL 297950, at *32 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2013) (“[The 
Fraudulent Transfer Act] provides broad remedies to creditors 
and leaves considerable leeway for the exercise of equitable 
discretion.”). 
25 6 Del. C. § 1310. 
26 Id. § 1307(a)(3)(c). 
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Crystallex alleges that, after expending a substantial 
amount of time and money in developing the long-inoperable 
gold reserves at Las Cristinas, Venezuela unlawfully usurped 
the mine and gifted it to Petróleos, which then sold 40% of 
that interest for a whopping $9.5 billion.  To make matters 
worse, at the time Venezuela seized Las Cristinas, Crystallex 
had yet to receive any return on its investment because of 
Venezuela’s purposeful delays in issuing required permits.  
Moreover, after Crystallex lawfully initiated an arbitration 
against Venezuela, Venezuela concocted a fraudulent scheme 
to repatriate $2.8 billion from PDV Holding to Petróleos in 
Venezuela.27  
 
 Altogether, I am hard-pressed to conceive of a 
scenario more worthy of a trial court’s invocation of its broad 
equitable powers under the Fraudulent Transfer Act than this 
one.  In my view, Crystallex has presented compelling and 
                                              
27 The majority suggests that I conflate liability and remedies.  
See Maj. Op. at 18-19.  Not at all.  To bring a claim under the 
Act, a plaintiff must allege the existence of a fraudulent 
transfer.  See 6 Del. C. § 1304(a).  As explained, I believe 
Crystallex did so.  Thus, Crystallex may bring “an action for 
relief against [that] transfer.”  Id. § 1307(a).  In outlining the 
relief available in such an action, the Act enumerates 
remedies against debtors and transferees involved in the 
transfer.  See id. §§ 1307(a), 1308(b).  While the Act does not 
specify remedies against non-debtor transferors, such as PDV 
Holding, its directive that courts craft “[a]ny [] relief the 
circumstances may require” provides a clear avenue for relief 
here.  Id. § 1307(a)(3)(c). 
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plausible facts to have its case against PDV Holding heard 
under the Act.  I would therefore affirm the District Court.28  
 
II.  Conclusion 
 
 For the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
                                              
28 The majority does not reach PDV Holding’s argument that, 
even if Crystallex stated a claim, the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act’s restrictions on prejudgment attachment of 
sovereign property preempt that claim.  See 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1609-1611.  Since I believe Crystallex stated a claim, I would 
reach the issue.  PDV Holding is not a foreign state; it is a 
Delaware corporation.  See id. § 1603.  As such, to the extent 
that Crystallex seeks relief with regard to PDV Holding’s 
property, I would hold that the restrictions on prejudgment 
attachment of sovereign property are inapplicable to 
Crystallex’s claim.  
